what, and so on. All other facts are "non-evaluative". So there are norma tive facts and non-nor ma tive facts, and there are evaluative facts and non-evaluative facts. For pres ent pur poses, we need not take a stand on how the first pair of cat e go ries is re lated to the sec ond pair of cat e go ries. Now, phi los o phers have of ten been in clined to think of the world as con sist ing fun da men tally of noth ing more than the non-nor ma tive, non-evaluative facts.
1 I'll use Anscombe's phrase "brute facts" to de note all and only those facts that are both non-nor ma tive and non-evaluative. 2 Us ing this ter mi nol ogy, I will say that phi los o phers have of ten strug gled to un der stand how the brute facts can some how add up to nor ma tive facts of var i ous kinds. How -they have won dered-can the brute facts make it the case that we have rea son to think or act in a par tic u lar way? Typ i cally, philo soph i cal at tempts to ad dress this ques tion lead to one of three re sults: reductionism, eliminativism, or emergentism. Re duc tionists at tempt to show how a con glom er a tion of brute facts can some how add up to a fact of the nor ma tive kind in ques tion. Thus, we might try to re duce moral facts to facts about what be hav ior would max i mize util ity or fit ness, epistemic facts to facts about the re li abil ity of our be lief-forming pro cesses, se man tic facts to facts about the covariation of neu ral events and ex ter nal events, and so on. Eliminativists claim that such reduc tion is im pos si ble, and so con clude that there re ally are no facts of the nor ma tive kind in ques tion (i. e., no moral facts, no epistemic facts, no se man tic facts). And fi nally, emergentists claim that re duc tion is impos si ble, and so con clude that the world con tains facts over and above the brute facts.
In his pa per "The Strange and In tel li gi ble Meta phys ics of Law", 3 Mark Greenberg of fers an el e gant and sim ple ar gu ment for emergentism about le gal nor ma tive facts, or what I will call "le gal emergentism". In RAM NETA 264 1 I will not at tempt to do cu ment this his to ri cal claim, nor will I at tempt to ex plain it. I re fer the in te res ted rea der to the clas sic work on this to pic, Burtt, The Me taph ysi cal Foun da tions of Mo dern Physi cal Scien ce, New York, Dou ble day, 1924.
2 Anscom be, G. E. M., "On Bru te Facts", Analy sis, 18, 1958. As Anscom be uses the term, a fact A is "bru te" only re la ti ve to anot her fact B. She lea ves it open whet her the re are facts that are bru te re la ti ve to any ot her facts. She al so lea ves it open whet her the rela ti ve bru te ness of a fact has to do with its being nor ma ti ve or non-nor ma ti ve, eva lua ti ve or non-eva lua ti ve. So I'm not su re that my use of the term "bru te fact" bears any sig ni ficant re sem blan ce to her use. No net he less, the term stri kes me as both con ve nient and appro pria tely evo ca ti ve.
3 Green berg, Mark, "The Stran ge and Inte lli gi ble Me taph ysics of Law" (fort hco ming).
other words, he ar gues that facts about what we have le gal rea son to do or not to do can not be re duced en tirely to brute facts. This is not to suggest that Greenberg thinks that the le gal nor ma tive facts are meta phys ically ba sic or prim i tive: he ex plic itly de nies this. Rather, what Greenberg claims is that, while the le gal nor ma tive facts might be re duced to some other facts, they can not be re duced en tirely to brute facts. For Greenberg, unless there were some evaluative facts, there could be no le gal nor mative facts. In this sense, then, Greenberg's metaphysics in cludes more than sim ply the brute facts. It also in cludes the evaluative facts, and it must, for Greenberg, in clude the evaluative facts if it is to in clude the legal nor ma tive facts. This is what I am call ing his "le gal emergentism". Greenberg's ar gu ment for le gal emergentism seems to have very rad i cal im pli ca tions, for it sug gests a more gen eral ar gu ment for emergentism con cern ing all nor ma tive facts, or what I will call "nor mative emergentism". If there is a sound, gen eral ar gu ment for nor ma tive emergentism, that would be news of the very great est im por tance to philosophy, for we would then know that the sparse meta phys i cal picture that in cludes noth ing more than the brute facts would leave out some thing. If Greenberg's ar gu ment re ally does give us a way to show some thing of this sort, then we should find out. In this pa per, I intend to find out. Spe cif i cally, I will do two things. First, I will ar gue that the gen er al iza tion of Greenberg's ar gu ment is not sound, and so does not es tab lish nor ma tive emergentism. But the flaw in the gen er alized ver sion of Greenberg's ar gu ment re veals some thing im por tant about his lo cal ar gu ment for le gal emergentism. And this brings me to the sec ond goal of this pa per, which is to show that the compellingness of Greenberg's lo cal ar gu ment for le gal emergentism de pends upon con tin gent and pos si bly un known facts of le gal his tory. If Greenberg's ar gu ment is com pel ling, then this can not be known a pri ori.
II. GREEN BERG'S ARGU MENT FOR LEGAL EMER GEN TISM
In this sec tion, I'll state Greenberg's ar gu ment for le gal emergentism. First, I'll briefly sum ma rize Greenberg's ex pla na tions of the ter mi nol ogy that he uses in his ar gu ment: "Le gal de ci sions" are de ci sions that leg is lators, judges, and other peo ple make, as well as other le gally rel e vant his -tor i cal events that can be fully char ac ter ized in brute terms. (I leave aside the dif fi cult but ir rel e vant is sue of what's in volved in be ing able to under stand a his tor i cal event "fully": let that is sue be set tled by what ever ac count, Greenberg can then de fine "le gal de ci sions" in terms of that account.) "Le gal con tent" is the nor ma tive con tent of the law, i. e. what is le gally for bid den or re quired, or more gen er ally, what le gal norms there are. "Le gal prop o si tions" are prop o si tions ar tic u lat ing le gal con tent.
Fi nally, to say that one thing A "pro vides rea son for" an other thing B is to say that A makes it the case that B, and makes it the case in a way that makes it at least some what rea son able for it to be the case that B. Equiv a lently, we can say that A "ra tio nally de ter mines" B. To il lus trate: there is noth ing rea son able or un rea son able about the fact that wa ter boils at 212 de grees Fahr en heit, and so what ever makes it the case that water boils at 212 de grees Fahr en heit does not ra tio nally de ter mine that fact. Noth ing ra tio nally de ter mines the fact that wa ter boils at 212 de grees Fahr en heit. In con trast, it is at least some what rea son able for the law to re quire that peo ple who are not con victed of crimes not re ceive pun ish ment. It's not just a fact that the law re quires this, but it is a reason able fact. Thus, what ever makes it the case that the law re quires this, pro vides a rea son for the law to re quire it, and so ra tio nally de ter mines that the law re quires it. These ex am ples should pro vide one with a general sense of how Greenberg is us ing the terms "pro vide a rea son" and "ra tio nally de ter mine". Ad mit tedly, I have not given a rig or ous ac count of these no tions, but then Greenberg does n't of fer a rig or ous ac count either, and I'm fol low ing his prac tice for now in or der to state his ar gument. It will turn out that his ar gu ment is sub ject to crit i cism no mat ter how pre cisely these no tions are ex pli cated.
Us ing the ter mi nol ogy above then, here is Greenberg's ar gu ment: 1) Prem ise D: In the le gal sys tem un der con sid er ation, there is a large body of de ter mi nate le gal prop o si tions.
2) Prem ise L: The le gal de ci sions in part de ter mine the con tent of the law.
3) The le gal de ci sions can de ter mine the con tent of the law only by pro vid ing rea son for the con tent of the law be ing what it is (in other words, the le gal de ci sions can de ter mine the con tent of the law only by ra tio nally de ter min ing it).
4) The le gal de ci sions pro vide rea son for the con tent of the law be ing what it is. (From 2, 3) 5) In a le gal sys tem with a large body of de ter mi nate le gal prop o sitions, the le gal de ci sions by them selves can not fully de ter mine what reason they pro vide for the con tent of the law be ing what it is (that is, the le gal de ci sions can not fully de ter mine ex actly how they ra tio nally de termine the con tent of the law.) 6) Some thing else be sides the le gal de ci sions must help to de ter mine what rea son the le gal de ci sions pro vide for the con tent of the law be ing what it is. (From 1, 4 , 5).
7) Evaluative facts are the only things that can play the role of help ing to de ter min ing what rea son the le gal de ci sions pro vide for the con tent of the law be ing what it is.
8) Evaluative facts en ter into de ter min ing the con tent of the law in the le gal sys tem un der con sid er ation (from 6, 7)
If this ar gu ment is sound, then all at tempts to re duce le gal con tent to the his tory of le gal de ci sions, or to the se man tic con tents of writ ten and spo ken texts, or to what judges had for break fast, must fail. For in stance, all ver sions of le gal pos i tiv ism and le gal re al ism fail. None of the brute facts can, by them selves, fully ra tio nally de ter mine the con tent of the law. That's be cause they can en ter into de ter min ing the con tent of the law only by pro vid ing rea son for the law be ing what it is. But these facts can not fully ra tio nally de ter mine their own ra tio nal sig nif i cance. That is, they can not fully ra tio nally de ter mine what rea son they have the power to pro vide. And that would be true no mat ter how broadly we ex tend this range of facts, so long as they ex clude the evaluative facts and the facts about le gal con tent. That to tal ity of facts still could not fully determine its own ra tio nal sig nif i cance for the con tent of the law. And so we would, ac cord ing to Greenberg, need to add some thing to it in or der fully to de ter mine the con tent of the law.
Here's one in tu itive way to think about Greenberg's the sis: The law re quires us to act in all sorts of de ter mi nate ways, and it for bids us to act in all sorts of de ter mi nate ways. But there must be some rea son for the law to re quire some things and for bid other things -the law's re quirements, un like the boil ing point of wa ter, are ei ther rea son able or un reason able, and some thing makes them ei ther rea son able or un rea son able. The brute facts by them selves can not pro vide rea son for the law to is sue these de ter mi nate re quire ments. The brute facts can not, on their own, makes the le gal re quire ments ei ther rea son able or un rea son able. So there must be some thing over and above the brute facts that pro vides rea son for the law to is sue these de ter mi nate re quire ments. And this ex tra fac tor is the value facts. Greenberg thus ar gues that no ver sion of legal reductionism can be right. If we grant prem ise 2, and so re ject legal eliminativism, Greenberg makes it look as if we must ac cept le gal emergentism.
III. THE GENE RA LI ZA TION OF GREEN BERG'S ARGU MENT
Part of what makes Greenberg's ar gu ment so im por tant is that it suggests a more gen eral ar gu ment con cern ing all nor ma tive sys tems of any in ter est what so ever -moral, epistemic, se man tic, and so on. To see this, let's con sider whether the pre mises of Greenberg's ar gu ment for le gal emergentism ap ply more gen er ally.
Prem ise 1 says that in the le gal sys tem un der con sid er ation, there is a large body of de ter mi nate le gal prop o si tions. But some thing anal o gous will be true of any in ter est ing nor ma tive sys tem. For in stance, any in terest ing moral code will in clude a large body of de ter mi nate moral re quirements. Any in ter est ing meth od ol ogy will in clude a large body of rules for the ory-choice. Any in ter est ing lin guis tic sys tem will in clude a large body of se man tic rules. And so on. So it seems that we can gen er al ize prem ise 1 as fol lows:
Prem ise 1': In the nor ma tive sys tem un der con sid er ation, there is a large body of de ter mi nate nor ma tive prop o si tions (here af ter, "norms").
Prem ise 2 of Greenberg's ar gu ment says that the le gal de ci sions in part de ter mine the con tent of the law. But again, it seems that some thing anal o gous will be true of any in ter est ing nor ma tive sys tem. For in stance, the nor ma tive con tent of a moral code de pends to some ex tent upon var ious brute facts about the crea tures to which the code ap plies (e. g. that they are mor tal, that they are ca pa ble of suf fer ing pain, that they can com mu ni cate, they are sus cep ti ble to cer tain kinds of temp ta tion, and so on). The nor ma tive con tent of a par tic u lar sci en tific meth od ol ogy depends to some ex tent upon var i ous brute facts about the the o ret i cal practice and prac ti tio ners to which that meth od ol ogy ap plies (e. g. that they have cer tain sense or gans and not oth ers, that they are ca pa ble of mak ing cer tain sorts of cal cu la tions eas ily but oth ers only with great dif fi culty, that their sense or gans can be trained to re spond re li ably to cer tain ranges of en er gies and not oth ers, and so on). And the nor ma tive con tent of a par tic u lar lin guis tic sys tem de pends to some ex tent upon var i ous brute facts about the crea tures that em ploy that lin guis tic sys tem (e. g. that they have a cer tain uni ver sal gram mar hard wired, that they have learned to speak a SVO lan guage in stead of a SOV lan guage, that they have learned to pro nounce cer tain pho ne mic com bi na tion and not oth ers, and so on). So it seems that we can gen er al ize prem ise 2 as fol lows:
Prem ise 2': The brute facts in part de ter mine the norms. Now it may be ob jected against prem ise 2' that there are some nor mative facts that are meta phys i cally ba sic: they do not de pend on any contin gent fea tures of the crea tures to whom they ap ply. For in stance, one might think that the cat e gor i cal im per a tive, or mo dus ponens, is such a rule. I will not con test such claims here (even though I do think that they are false).
4 But even if they are true, we can still ac cept that prem ise 2 holds for all nor ma tive sys tems of which prem ise 1' is true, i. e., all norma tive sys tems that gen er ate many de ter mi nate norms. The cat e gor i cal im per a tive, all by it self, does n't gen er ate many de ter mi nate norms. It can only gen er ate many de ter mi nate norms when it's con joined with lots of con tin gent facts about the fea tures of the ac tual agents to whom it applies. The same holds of any other al leg edly nec es sary and ba sic nor mative fact. So, even if there are nec es sary and ba sic nor ma tive facts, this does not threaten prem ise 2'.
Prem ise 3 of Greenberg's ar gu ment says that the le gal de ci sions can de ter mine the con tent of the law only by pro vid ing rea son for the con tent of the law be ing what it is. Re call that the phrase "pro vid ing rea son" is here be ing used to sig nify a meta phys i cal re la tion: X pro vides rea son for Y just in case X makes Y ob tain and also makes it rea son able for Y to ob tain. In this sense, noth ing pro vides rea son for wa ter to boil at 212 degrees Fahr en heit: it just does. But some thing does pro vide rea son for the law to re quire that peo ple not con victed of a crime not re ceive punish ment. In stead of us ing the phrase "pro vid ing rea son" to des ig nate this meta phys i cal re la tion, we might equally well use the phrase "make it rea son able".
ON THE NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF BRUTE FACTS 269 4 Briefly, the ca te go ri cal im pe ra ti ve is not a rea son for an yo ne to do any thing: rather it is a cons traint upon so met hing's being a good prac ti cal rea son. Again, mo dus ponens is not a rea son for an yo ne to think any thing, but, in tan dem with the laws of lo gic, pla ces a cons traint upon what it is for so met hing to be a good theo re ti cal rea son. Now, we might worry that these ex am ples do not give us a firm grasp on the meta phys i cal no tion of "pro vid ing rea son" or "mak ing it rea sonable". Greenberg tells us a bit more about this no tion, at least in its ap plica tion to the law. Here's what he says:
"The ba sic idea is that the con tent of the law is in prin ci ple ac ces si ble to a ra tio nal crea ture who is aware of the rel e vant le gal prac tices. It is not pos si ble that the truth of a le gal prop o si tion could sim ply be opaque, in the sense that there would be no pos si bil ity of see ing its truth to be an in tel li gi ble con se quence of the le gal prac tices. In other words, that the le gal prac tices sup port these le gal prop o si tions over all oth ers is al ways a mat ter of rea sons -where rea sons are con sid er ations in prin ci ple in tel ligi ble to ra tio nal crea tures".
I'm even tu ally go ing to raise a ques tion about how to in ter pret this pas sage. But for now, I'll al low the pas sage to stand with out com ment, and I'll ask whether some thing anal o gous to this pas sage could be said about the de ter mi na tion of norms in other kinds of nor ma tive sys tem. For in stance, do the brute facts that en ter into de ter min ing the norms of a moral code make it rea son able for the norms to be what they are? Do the brute facts that en ter into de ter min ing the norms of a par tic u lar meth odol ogy make it rea son able for the norms to be what they are? Do the brute facts that en ter into de ter min ing the se man tic norms of a par tic u lar lin guis tic sys tem make it rea son able for the norms to be what they are? I think it's not en tirely clear how to an swer these ques tions. But I shall now ar gue that there is at least some plau si bil ity in an swer ing each of them af fir ma tively.
Here's my ar gu ment: If the brute facts do not make it rea son able for the norms to be what they are, then ei ther noth ing makes it rea son able for the norms to be what they are, or else the rea son for the norms to be what they are is in de pend ent of the brute facts. Let's con sider what follows from each of these two hy poth e ses.
If the first hy poth e sis is right, then noth ing makes it rea son able for the norms to be what they are. In that case, it's ar bi trary that the norms are what they are, i. e., there is noth ing rea son able about the norms be ing what they are rather than some other way; they just are that way. But if there is noth ing rea son able about the norms be ing what they are, then those norms are like the rules of a game that there is no rea son to play, or the rules of a prac tice that there is no rea son to par tic i pate in. That is to say, there is no rea son to fol low those norms, and so they are not re ally norms at all. But this con tra dicts our hy poth e sis that they are norms. There fore, the first hy poth e sis can not be right, and so some thing must make it rea son able for the norms to be what they are.
This line of rea son ing will give rise to two ob jec tions: first, it may be ob jected that it gen er ates an in fi nite re gress of norms. But this is n't so. We can avoid the in fi nite re gress ei ther by ap peal to a big cir cle of norms, or by ap peal to some foun da tion that makes it rea son able for the norms to be as they are, but is not it self a norm. We need n't choose between these strat e gies here.
Sec ond, it might be ob jected that, many of our ac tual norms are ar bitrary, but are, for all that, still norms. For in stance, it may be said, we have rea son to fol low the par tic u lar lin guis tic norms of our lan guage com mu nity, even though those norms are ar bi trary. Again, we have reason to stay within the speed limit, even though that is ar bi trary as well. The prob lem with this ob jec tion is that these are not cases of our hav ing rea son to fol low ar bi trary norms. Rather, they are cases in which the spe cific norms that we have rea son to fol low are de ter mined by more gen eral norms, to gether with var i ous non-nor ma tive con tin gen cies. For in stance, there is a gen eral norm to the ef fect that we should speak in such a way as to make our selves un der stood. But this gen eral norm makes it rea son able for us to com ply with the more spe cific norms of our lin guis tic com mu nity, what ever those hap pen to be. Again, there is a gen eral norm to the ef fect that one should do what one can to avoid punish ment and pro mote so cial co or di na tion. This gen eral norm makes it rea son able for us to com ply with the laws of our land, what ever those hap pen to be (at least within lim its). In each of these cases, one has a rea son to do some spe cific thing be cause it is dic tated by one's rea son to do some more gen eral thing, along with the con tin gen cies of one's partic u lar sit u a tion. These are not cases of hav ing a rea son to do some thing for no rea son at all. And so these cases do not in val i date the prin ci ple used in the pre ced ing ar gu ment: if noth ing makes it rea son able for a norm to be as it is, then there is no rea son to fol low the norm, and so it is not re ally a norm at all.
I con clude that the first hy poth e sis can not be right. If the sec ond hypoth e sis is right, then the rea son for the norms to be what they are is inde pend ent of the brute facts that de ter mine those norms. In that case, it's ar bi trary that the norms are bind ing on all and only those crea tures of which the de ter min ing brute facts ob tain. For in stance, it's ar bi trary that the norms are bind ing on mor tal crea tures who are ca pa ble of feel ing pain, rather than on an gels. And in that case, again there's noth ing that makes the norms in ques tion bind ing on crea tures like us. And that is just to say that, while the norms might re ally be norms for some creatures, they are not re ally norms for us. They are like rules of a game that crea tures like us have no rea son to play.
We can con clude that nei ther the first nor the sec ond hy poth e sis can be right. It seems then, that for any nor ma tive sys tem of which pre mises 1' and 2' are true (i. e., any nor ma tive sys tem that has de ter mi nate norms that are bind ing on us), the brute facts that de ter mine the norms of that sys tem must pro vide rea son for us to com ply with those norms, and so pro vide rea son for those norms to be what they are. If the pre ced ing line of thought is cor rect (and I will re turn to re-ex am ine it be low), then we can gen er al ize prem ise 3 as fol lows:
Prem ise 3': The brute facts can de ter mine the norms only by pro viding rea son (i. e., mak ing it rea son able) for the norms be ing what they are.
Prem ise 5 of Greenberg's ar gu ment says that, in a le gal sys tem with a large body of de ter mi nate le gal prop o si tions, the le gal de ci sions by them selves can not fully de ter mine what rea son they pro vide for the content of the law be ing what it is. There are many pos si ble mappings from le gal de ci sions to le gal con tent, and the le gal de ci sions, ac cord ing to Greenberg, can not them selves de ter mine which pos si ble map ping is the cor rect one. That's why other facts, be sides the le gal de ci sions, are needed to de ter mine the cor rect map ping. Now, so far as I can see, whether or not prem ise 5 is true de pends upon noth ing that is pe cu liar to le gal normativity. What ever it is that makes it the case that le gal de cisions can not de ter mine the cor rect map ping from them selves onto the facts of le gal con tent, that same thing makes it the case that brute facts can not de ter mine the cor rect map ping from them selves onto the nor mative facts. If there is sup posed to be some thing spe cial about the de termi na tion of le gal norms in this re gard, it's not at all clear what it could be. This sug gests that, if prem ise 5 is true, then so is.
Prem ise 5': In a nor ma tive sys tem with a large body of de ter mi nate norms, the brute facts by them selves can not fully de ter mine what rea son they pro vide for the norms be ing what they are.
Fi nally, prem ise 7 says that evaluative facts are the only things that can play the role of help ing to de ter mine what rea son the le gal de ci sions pro vide for the con tent of the law be ing what it is. Greenberg ex plains this point in the fol low ing pas sage:
In or der for the de ci sions to yield de ter mi na te le gal re qui re ments, it has to be the ca se that the re are truths about which mo dels are bet ter than ot hers, in de pen dently of how much the mo dels are sup por ted by the le gal de cisions. Sin ce the de ci sions must ra tio nally de ter mi ne the con tent of the law, truths about which mo dels are bet ter than ot hers can not simply be bru te; the re ha ve to be rea sons that fa vor so me mo dels over ot hers.
The rea son that fa vors some mod els over oth ers in cludes facts about which models are better. And these are evaluative facts. But for the same rea son that evaluative facts are needed fully to de ter mine the correct map ping from le gal de ci sions onto le gal norms, so too, it seems, evaluative facts will be needed fully to de ter mine the cor rect map ping from brute facts onto other norms gen er ally. If prem ise 7 is true, then so is Prem ise 7: Evaluative facts are the only things that can plau si bly play the role of help ing to de ter mine what rea son the brute facts pro vide for the norms be ing what they are.
With all this in mind, we can now con sider the fol low ing gen er al ization of Greenberg's ar gu ment: 1') Prem ise D: In the nor ma tive sys tem un der con sid er ation, there is a large body of de ter mi nate norms.
2') Prem ise L: The brute facts in part de ter mine the norms. 3') The brute facts can de ter mine the norms only by pro vid ing rea son for the norms be ing what they are.
4') The brute facts pro vide rea son for the norms be ing what they are. (From 2', 3' ).
5') In a nor ma tive sys tem with a large body of de ter mi nate norms, the brute facts by them selves can not fully de ter mine what rea son they provide for the norms be ing what they are.
6') Some thing else be sides the brute facts must help to de ter mine what rea son the brute facts pro vide for the norms be ing what they are. (From 1', 4 ', 5') 7') Evaluative facts are the only things that can play the role of helping to de ter mine what rea son the brute facts pro vide for the norms be ing what they are.
8) Evaluative facts en ter into de ter min ing the norms in the nor ma tive sys tem un der con sid er ation. (From 6, 7) .
By gen er al iz ing Greenberg's ar gu ment, we've con structed an ar gument for nor ma tive emergentism. The ar gu ment as sumes (prem ise 2) that nor ma tive eliminativism is false, but from this as sump tion it ar gues against nor ma tive reductionism.
IV. WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS GENE RAL ARGU MENT
FOR NOR MA TI VE EMER GEN TISM?
I will now ar gue that this gen eral ar gu ment for nor ma tive emergentism is not com pel ling, for ei ther prem ise 5 is false or else we have no rea son to ac cept prem ise 3'. I'll be gin by lev el ing an ob jec tion against prem ise 5, and then I'll ar gue that the only way to save prem ise 5' from this ob jec tion is to in ter pret the no tion of "pro vid ing rea son" in such a way that we have no rea son to ac cept prem ise 3'.
Prem ise 5' says that in a nor ma tive sys tem with a large body of de termi nate norms, the brute facts by them selves can not fully de ter mine what rea son they pro vide for the norms be ing what they are. But let's consider whether or not this gen eral claim is borne out by cases. For instance, sup pose that Al ice mowed the lawn be cause John prom ised to pay her 400 dol lars if she mowed the lawn. Now, what makes it wrong for John to break his prom ise? What makes it wrong for John to break his prom ise is that it would be a case of break ing a prom ise, and it's gener ally wrong to break prom ises. That's an es sen tial fea ture of the practice of prom is ing: mak ing a prom ise places one un der an ob li ga tion to keep it (ex cept in very spe cial cir cum stances). The prac tice of prom is ing es sen tially in volves norms that are bind ing on all those who par tic i pate in that prac tice, and these norms in clude the norm that it's wrong to break a prom ise. When I say that the prac tice of prom is ing "es sen tially" in volves these norms, I mean that it's not just true by con ven tion that the prac tice of prom is ing in volves the norm that it's wrong to break one's prom ise. It's not just that we hap pen to use the word "prom is ing" to des ig nate prac tices that have this fea ture. Rather, the prac tice of prom is -ing es sen tially in volves the norm in ques tion be cause there's no way for the prac tice of prom is ing to ex ist over time with out that norm. If peo ple were gen er ally per mit ted to break their prom ises, then peo ple would know this, and so would not ex pect other peo ple to keep their prom ises, and so would tend not to act on any such ex pec ta tion. Ev ery one would quickly be able to no tice this fact, and so no one would con tinue to expect her own prom ises to have any im pact. Each per son would thereby lose in cen tive to make prom ises. In short, the in sti tu tion of prom is ing would quickly cease to ex ist if peo ple were gen er ally per mit ted to break their prom ises. For there to be an in sti tu tion of prom is ing, it must be wrong for peo ple to break their prom ises. Thus, it's an es sen tial fea ture of the prac tice of prom is ing that it in volves the norm that it's wrong to break your prom ises.
But this just pushes our orig i nal ques tion back a step. Now, in stead of ask ing why John must keep his prom ise, we can ask why John has reason to par tic i pate in this es sen tially norm-gov erned prac tice of prom ising. And there could be any num ber of an swers to this ques tion. For instance, John might have an in ter est in hav ing his lawn mowed, and he recognizes that the only way that he can get his lawn mowed is by promising some able-bod ied per son that he'll pay them if they mow it. Or John might, like some chil dren, sim ply en joy par tic i pat ing in a so cial prac tice that af fords him op por tu ni ties for mar ket in ter ac tions with others. But what ever the story, so long as John has some rea son to par tic ipate in the prac tice of prom is ing, he has rea son to com ply with the norms of that prac tice, and so they are norms for him. Now let's con sider whether I have in deed pro vided "the rea son", in Greenberg's sense, for why it's wrong for John to break his prom ise. We can as sess this is sue by con sid er ing what it is for a nor ma tive fact to ob tain "for a rea son", on Greenberg's use of that phrase. Para phras ing the pas sage from Greenberg quoted above, we can say this: for norms to ob tain for some rea son is for the con tents of those norms to be in prin ciple ac ces si ble to a ra tio nal crea ture who is aware of the rel e vant brute de ter mi nants of the norms. It is not pos si ble that the ob tain ing of those nor ma tive facts could sim ply be opaque, in the sense that there would be no pos si bil ity of see ing them to be in tel li gi ble con se quences of the rel evant brute de ter mi nants. In other words, that the rel e vant brute de ter minants sup port these nor ma tive prop o si tions over all oth ers is al ways a mat ter of con sid er ations in prin ci ple in tel li gi ble to ra tio nal crea tures. Now, it seems that, in the story that I've told about prom is ing, I've shown how the wrong ness of John's break ing his prom ise fol lows from the gen eral pro hi bi tion against break ing prom ises. But that gen eral prohi bi tion is an in tel li gi ble con se quence of var i ous brute facts about the prac tice of prom is ing. And John's rea sons for en gag ing in that prac tice are them selves in tel li gi ble con se quences of var i ous brute facts about John (e. g., what he likes and does n't like). Thus, it seems, I've ar tic ulated the rea son why it's wrong for John to break his prom ise. I've provided an ex pla na tion of what makes it wrong for John to break his promise, and my ex pla na tion ad verts solely to brute facts about the so cial func tion of the in sti tu tion of prom is ing, and about John. If my ex pla nation is cor rect, then prem ise 5' is false.
Of course this is not be cause of some thing spe cial about prom is ing. Many other norms are equally sus cep ti ble of ex pla na tion in terms of brute facts. In or der to res cue prem ise 5' from these ap par ent coun terex am ples, the de fender of nor ma tive emergentism seems to have only one way out, and that is to claim that these ex pla na tions are not ex pla nations of the right kind at all -they do not ex plain what rea son there is for the norms be ing what they are. Now, I'm not sure how strong a case can be made for or against this way of avoid ing the ob jec tion that I've just lev eled, and that's be cause I'm not sure ex actly what's in volved in the meta phys i cal con sti tu tive re la tion that Greenberg uses the term "provid ing a rea son" to des ig nate. What ex actly is in volved in the re la tion between nor ma tive facts and their brute de ter mi nants be ing "a mat ter of rea sons" or "in prin ci ple in tel li gi ble to a ra tio nal crea ture"? Since I'm not sure how to an swer these ques tions, I will not at tempt to ar gue against this pro posed way of avoid ing my ob jec tion to prem ise 5'.
In stead, I'll point out that it does the nor ma tive emergentist no good. For if my aforestated ex pla na tion of why it's wrong to break a prom ise does n't "pro vide a rea son" (in the rel e vant sense) for why it's wrong to break a prom ise, then I don't see why we should think that any thing else "pro vides a rea son" (in the rel e vant sense). In other words, if I have n't provided a rea son for why it's wrong to break a prom ise, then why should we think that there is any rea son (in the rel e vant sense) for why it's wrong to break a prom ise? Why should n't we just think that the wrong ness of break ing a prom ise is a meta phys i cally ba sic fact of the world? Or it ob tains not by vir tue of some thing else pro vid ing a rea son for it, but rather by vir tue of some thing mak ing it ob tain, in some non-ratio nal way?
Now re call that we have al ready con sid ered a plau si ble ar gu ment against these ap par ent pos si bil i ties: if there is no rea son for the norms to be as they are, then we have no rea son to com ply with those norms, and so they are not re ally norms. Now, I do find some thing plau si ble about this ar gu ment, when the no tion of "rea son" that it em ploys is broad enough to in clude the kind of rea son that I gave above for why it's wrong to break a prom ise. But if the no tion of "rea son" is in ter preted more nar rowly than that, then the ar gu ment seems to me to lose its plausi bil ity. Why should there be a "rea son", in this spe cial, nar row sense, for why it's wrong to break a prom ise? If there is no "rea son", in this spe cial nar row sense, for why it's wrong to break a prom ise, then how does it fol low that we have no "rea son", in a broad, or di nary sense, for not break ing our prom ises? Pend ing an an swer to this ques tion, there seems to be noth ing to fa vor prem ise 3'.
In sum, if we grant that prem ise 5' is false, then we have no rea son to be lieve prem ise 3'. Ei ther way, the ar gu ment for nor ma tive emergentism is not com pel ling. Now what, if any thing, does this show about Greenberg's lo cal ar gu ment for le gal emergentism?
V. THE CON SE QUEN CES FOR GREEN BERG'S LOCAL ARGU MENT FOR LEGAL EMER GEN TISM
In the pre ced ing sec tion, I ar gued that the gen er al iza tion of Greenberg's ar gu ment is not com pel ling: ei ther prem ise 5' is false (for the brute facts do fully de ter mine that John must pay Al ice 400 dol lars), or else we have no rea son to be lieve prem ise 3' (for we don't know enough about the ra tio nal de ter mi na tion re la tion). I will now ar gue that an anal o gous, but some what weaker, con clu sion is true of Greenberg's lo cal ar gu ment for le gal emergentism: ei ther prem ise 5 is sub ject to histor i cal fal si fi ca tion (for all we know a pri ori, the le gal de ci sions may be such as to fully de ter mine their own ra tio nal sig nif i cance), or else we have no rea son to be lieve prem ise 3 (for we don't know enough about the ra tio nal de ter mi na tion re la tion).
Re call that prem ise 5 says that in a le gal sys tem with a large body of de ter mi nate le gal prop o si tions, the le gal de ci sions by them selves can not fully determine what rea son they pro vide for the con tent of the law be ing what it is. Now, in de fend ing this prem ise, Greenberg con sid ers a foundationalist chal lenge to it and a coherentist chal lenge to it. I would like to fo cus on the foundationalist chal lenge, and Greenberg's re sponse to it. Here is the rel e vant text:
Can the le gal de ci sions de ter mi ne which mo del is co rrect, thus de ter mining how the de ci sions con tri bu te to the con tent of the law? If the de cisions are to de ter mi ne which mo del is co rrect, the re are two pos si bi li ties. First, a pri vi le ged foun da tio nal de ci sion (or set of foun da tio nal de ci sions) can de ter mi ne the ro le of ot her de ci sions. The re is then the pro blem of how the de ci sions them sel ves can de ter mi ne which de ci sions are foun datio nal. …A pu tati vely foun da tio nal de ci sion can not non-ques tion-beggingly pro vi de the rea son that it is foun da tio nal. In sum, a foun da tio na list so lu tion is ho pe less be cau se it re qui res so me in de pen dent con si de ra tion that de ter mi nes which de ci sions are foun da tio nal. Now, I'd like to ask why a pu ta tively foun da tional de ci sion can not pro vide the rea son that it is foun da tional. Sup pose that, when the framers drafted the Amer i can Con sti tu tion, they had in cluded a clause that stated ex plic itly and pre cisely how the con tent of the law was to de pend upon the le gal de ci sions. Could n't their de ci sion to in clude this clause be a foun da tional de ci sion, and pro vide the rea son why it is foun da tional?
Per haps Greenberg would ob ject that their de ci sion to in clude this clause could not have non-ques tion-beggingly pro vided the rea son why it is foun da tional: if their de ci sion is foun da tional, that's just be cause the de ci sion says that it is foun da tional, and so its foun da tional char ac ter is founded in a ques tion-beg ging way. But then I ask: why must the rea son why a de ci sion is foun da tional be non-ques tion-beg ging, in this sense?
I can imag ine, on Greenberg's be half, the fol low ing re sponse to this ques tion: sup pose that there are two pu ta tively foun da tional but in consis tent de ci sions. In that case, nei ther de ci sion can pro vide a rea son why it, rather than the other, is re ally the foun da tional de ci sion. And so neither de ci sion can be foun da tional, ex cept by dint of the help of some addi tional fac tor. In that case, each de ci sion has its ra tio nal sig nif i cance for the con tent of the law only by dint of the help of this ad di tional fac tor. I'll grant that this is true in the case in which we have two pu ta tively foun da tional but in con sis tent de ci sions. But I don't see why it should also be true for the case in which we have only one pu ta tively foun dational de ci sion, the dic tates of which are con sis tent with all of the le gal de ci sions. In short, I don't see why there can not be a gen u inely foun dational de ci sion that pro vides the rea son why it is it self foun da tional. Now, it is open to Greenberg to ob ject that, in the case that I've described, what we have is a le gal de ci sion that meta phys i cally de ter mines the cor rect model, but not a le gal de ci sion that pro vides a rea son why one model is cor rect. Since I don't have a fully firm grip on the no tion of "pro vid ing a rea son", I will not ob ject to this re sponse. But then, if that is the re sponse, I won der what rea son we have to think that de cisions de ter mine the con tent of the law by "pro vid ing rea son" (in the rel evant sense) for that con tent be ing what it is.
So my chal lenge to Greenberg stands as fol lows: If, as a mat ter of con tin gent his tor i cal fact, the fram ers had in cluded a clause ex plic itly stat ing pre cisely how le gal de ci sions were to de ter mine le gal con tent, and this clause was con sis tent with all other le gal de ci sions, then ei ther prem ise 5 of Greenberg's ar gu ment is false, or else we don't have any reason to ac cept prem ise 3. Ei ther way, the compellingness of Greenberg's ar gu ment de pends on a mat ter of con tin gent, and pos si bly un known, facts of le gal his tory. 
